CRIMINAL LAW—WHOSE HEAD IS IN THE SAND? PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF THE OSTRICH INSTRUCTION IN CONSPIRACY CASES by Chinni, Christine L.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 13 13 (1991)
Issue 1 Article 2
1-1-1991
CRIMINAL LAW—WHOSE HEAD IS IN THE
SAND? PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF THE
OSTRICH INSTRUCTION IN CONSPIRACY
CASES
Christine L. Chinni
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New
England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christine L. Chinni, CRIMINAL LAW—WHOSE HEAD IS IN THE SAND? PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF THE OSTRICH
INSTRUCTION IN CONSPIRACY CASES, 13 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 35 (1991), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/
vol13/iss1/2
NOTES & COMMENTS 

CRIMINAL LAW-WHOSE HEAD Is IN THE SAND? PROBLEMS 
WITH THE USE OF THE OSTRICH INSTRUCTION IN CONSPIRACY 
CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and 
indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong 
suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone 
had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of 
what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted knowingly 
I 
The preceding is an example of a jury instruction given with in­
creasing frequency in criminal cases in which the defendant's guilty 
knowledge is at issue. This instruction has several names, the most 
colorful of which is the Seventh Circuit's term, the "ostrich 
instruction."2 
The courts have used the instruction in a wide variety of contexts, 
including mail fraud, 3 importation and possession of narcotics,4 aiding 
and abetting of the misapplication of federally insured funds, s aiding 
and abetting the escape of a federal prisoner,6 and recently, in conspir­
acy cases.7 This Comment will focus on the propriety of the instruc­
1. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
2075 (1989). 
2. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Holland, 831 F.2d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). Other 
courts have their own names for the instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 
697, 703 (9th Cir.) (en bane) ("deliberate ignorance"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); 
United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 288 (2d Cir.) ("conscious avoidance"), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 821 (1973). 
3. Ramsey, 785 F.2d at 185. 
4. United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 935 (1978). 
5. Holland, 831 F.2d at 722. 
6. United States v. Nordstrom, 730 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 1984). 
7. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988) (sustaining district 
court's use of the instruction), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2075 (1989); United States v. Kehm, 
35 
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tion in conspiracy prosecutions in cases in which the defendant argues 
that he or she was not a member of the conspiracy. The Seventh Cir­
cuit allows the use of the instruction in such cases;8 the Second Circuit 
forbids it. 9 
In United States v. Diaz,1O the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed a conviction for conspiracy in a case in which the district 
court judge gave an ostrich instruction, II although the defendant ar­
gued that he was not a member of the conspiracy.12 In its decision, 
the court criticized the decision of the Second Circuit in a similar case, 
United States v. Mankani.13 In Mankani, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the conscious avoidance theory of criminal knowl­
edge, which is the basis for the ostrich instruction, cannot be used in a 
case in which the defendant's membership in the conspiracy is in 
dispute. 14 
The Diaz ls and Mankani 16 decisions demonstrate the differences 
between the two approaches, and the different results which may fol­
low. The purpose of this Comment is to explore the reasoning behind 
the two approaches, and discuss how one court decided that the use of 
the ostrich instruc;tion in certain conspiracy cases is nonsensical given 
the mens rea for conspiracy, while the other court chose to allow 
broad use of the instruction in conspiracy cases. The Comment also 
analyzes the implications of these differing views for a defendant who 
argues that he or she has never joined the alleged conspiracy. Section 
I focuses on the provision of the Model Penal Code which provides the 
basis for the ostrich instruction,17 and traces the Supreme Court's use 
799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1986) (sustaining the district court's use of the instruction); 
United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing district court, 
and forbidding use of the instruction in connection with membership in the conspiracy). 
8. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 549. 
9. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 547. The other circuits have yet to hear this issue, and the 
Supreme Court has thus far never granted certiorari in a case involving the ostrich instruc­
tion and membership in a conspiracy. 
10. 864 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2075 (1989). 
11. Id. at 551. 
12. Id. at 550-51. 
13. 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984) (criticized in Diaz, 864 F.2d at 549). 
14. Id. at 547 & n.1. Mankani was distinguished in United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 
1015, 1021-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986) and United States v. Reed, 790 
F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986). In both of these cases, the 
defendant admitted that he was a member of the group charged with conspiracy, but ar­
gued that he was ignorant of the group's illegal activity. 
15. 864 F.2d 544. 
16. 738 F.2d 538. 
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985). See infra note 21 for the text of 
§ 2.02(7). 
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of this definition in the late 1960s and early 1970s.18 Section I con­
cludes with a discussion of the development of jury instructions based 
on equating conscious avoidance of knowledge with actual knowl­
edge. 19 Section II explores the substantive law of conspiracy, focusing 
on the mens rea element. Section III discusses United States v. Diaz 
and United States v. Mankani, two cases which deal with the applica­
bility of the theory behind the ostrich instruction to a situation in 
which membership in a conspiracy is at issue and the differences be­
tween the two approaches. Section IV analyzes the two approaches in 
light of the mens rea for conspiracy, certain procedural aspects of con­
spiracy trials and certain policy issues. Section IV also suggests that 
courts give an instruction which clarifies the mens rea for conspiracy if 
they give an ostrich instruction in connection with a defendant's mem­
bership in a conspiracy. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OSTRICH INSTRUCTION 
A. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) 
In response to the inconsistent penal codes in force in many 
states, the American Legal Institute began drafting the Model Penal 
Code ("M.P.C.") in the late 1950s.20 Among its general definitions of 
types of culpability, the M.P.C. included a provision equating deliber­
ate ignorance with knowledge.21 In adopting this approach, the 
M.P.C. followed a common law tradition equating deliberate avoid­
ance of knowledge with actual knowledge.22 
18. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1970) (affirming a finding of 
knowledge based on deliberate ignorance, citing MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7) (proposed 
Official Draft, 1962) and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969»; Leary v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 6,46 (1969) (citing MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7) as a valid definition of 
criminal knowledge, and holding that the government had not proved deliberate avoid­
ance). See infra notes 23-32 for a discussion of Leary and Turner. 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524,527-29 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287-88 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1971). 
20. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 1.02 commentary at 14-15 (1985); Goodrich, Foreword 
to MODEL PENAL CoDE at vii-viii (proposed Official Code 1962). 
21. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7) (1985). The section provides, U[w)hen knowl­
edge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is 
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes that it does not exist." 
22. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 196-203 (1990). 
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B. 	 Early Supreme Court Cases Applying MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(7): Leary v. United States 23 and Turner v. United 
States 24 
In 1969, the Supreme Court, citing the M.P.C., adopted the delib­
erate ignorance definition of knowledge in Leary v. United States.25 
While in possession of a small amount of marijuana, the defendant in 
Leary drove from New York to Mexico with his son and daughter. 26 
The prosecution argued that the defendant deliberately avoided learn­
ing that the marijuana he carried was produced outside the United 
States, and that by bringing it across the border into Mexico and back, 
he was guilty of smuggling.27 On the issue of deliberate ignorance, the 
prosecution argued that the possession of marijuana proved that the 
defendant had the guilty knowledge necessary to sustain a conviction 
for the more serious crime of smuggling because only deliberate avoid­
ance of knowledge could have kept the defendant ignorant of the for­
eign source of the narcotics he possessed.28 The Court, while 
endorsing the equation of deliberate ignorance with knowledge, found 
that the prosecution had not proved that the defendant had deliber­
ately avoided learning that the marijuana he possessed had been pro­
duced outside the United States.29 The prosecution failed to establish 
that the marijuana in the defendant's possession was obviously not 
grown in the United States. 3D 
One year later, in Turner v. United States,3l the Court held that 
the prosecution's proof that the defendant had engaged in heroin and 
cocaine trafficking also satisfied the knowledge requirement of the 
smuggling statute. The Court stated that mere common sense would 
have led to the knowledge that the heroin came from a foreign source, 
unless the trafficker was deliberately ignorant. The prosecution suc­
cessfully argued that anyone engaged in heroin trafficking must know 
that the source of that heroin was foreign, unless the trafficker deliber­
ately avoided this knowledge. The Court held that, since little or no 
heroin was manufactured in the United States, and the defendant did 
not explain his ignorance as to the source of the heroin, a finding of 
23. 	 395 u.s. 6 (1969). 
24. 	 396 u.S. 398 (1970). 
25. 	 395 U.S. at 46 & n.93. 
26. 	 Id. at 9. 
27. 	 Id. at 46. 
28. 	 Id. 
29. 	 Id. 
30. 	 Id. 
31. 	 396 U.S. 398,416·17 (1970). 
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deliberate ignorance, and therefore knowledge, was proper.32 Thus, 
by 1970, the Supreme Court had acknowledged the validity of equat­
ing deliberate ignorance with guilty knowledge. 
C. 	 The Courts ofAppeals Take the Next Step: Jury Instructions 
Based on Equating Deliberate Ignorance With Knowledge 
While Leary and Turner did not focus on jury instructions based 
on conscious ignorance, the federal courts of appeals drew the infer­
ence that an instruction based on equating deliberate ignorance with 
knowledge was acceptable, and began to uphold such instructions in 
some situations during the 19708.33 While the Second Circuit was the 
first to uphold a deliberate ignorance instruction, it soon had company 
in its approval of the instruction. By the late 19708, nearly all of the 
circuits allowed the instruction in some contexts.34 Some courts were 
more cautious about the content and use of the instruction than 
others. For example, the Ninth Circuit, concerned about both context 
and content, was reluctant to approve of the instruction.35 Still, most 
of the courts of appeals have accepted the argument that the Supreme 
Court's use of the M.P.C.'s definition of knowledge36 indicates that an 
32. Id. In Turner, narcotics agents stopped the car in which the defendant was a 
passenger and retrieved several packages he had discarded. One of the packages contained 
a mixture of heroin and powder. Id. at 401, 416-18. 
33. The Second Circuit, which has since been cautious in its use of the ostrich in­
struction, was the first to allow an instruction based on MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7). In 
United States v. Squires, the Second Circuit adopted the definition of knowledge in 2.02(7) 
and approved a jury instruction based on conscious avoidance, but reversed the conviction 
on other grounds. 440 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1971). Two years later, the Second Cir­
cuit sustained a conviction based upon an ostrich instruction in a case concerning the pos­
session of stolen currency. United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287-88 (2d Cir.), cen. 
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). 
34. See generally 1 DEVITI & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN­
STRUCTIONS (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1990), which states that some form of the ostrich in­
struction is allowed in all circuits except the 4th and 6th. See. e.g., United States v. Kehm, 
799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Nordstrom, 730 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 312 (1st Cir.), cert. denied. 446 U.S. 919 
(1980); United States V. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524,527-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 935 (1978); United States V. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); United States V. Squires, 440 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1971). 
35. The Ninth Circuit, concerned that the instruction could lead to the substitution 
of negligence for knowledge as the level of mens rea the prosecution must prove for certain 
crimes, has suggested specific wording, and actively advocated cautious use of the instruc­
tion. See. e.g., United States V. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. de­
nied, 487 U.S. 1222 (1988); Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702-04. For a discussion of the Ninth 
Circuit's use of the instruction in general, see Note, United States V. Alvarado: Reflections 
on a Jewell, 19 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 47 (1989). 
36. Turner V. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416-17 & n.29 (1970) (quoting MODEL 
PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7»; Leary, 395 U.S. at 46 n.93 (also quoting MODEL PENAL CODE 
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instruction based on conscious ignorance is permissible. The instruc­
tion allows a prosecutor to make use of the inferences which can be 
drawn from a defendant's avoidance of knowledge of certain facts. By 
equating such deliberate ignorance with knowledge, a prosecutor may 
convict a criminal who is benefiting from criminal activity but has in­
sulated himself from the actual commission of a crime. 
More recently, the Second and Seventh Circuits have allowed the 
use of the instruction in conspiracy prosecutions,37 although the two 
courts disagree about how and when the instruction can be given in 
such cases. Much of the disagreement centers on the mens rea for 
conspiracy and the appropriateness of the ostrich instruction in light 
of the requisite mens rea. In order to evaluate the two approaches and 
consider alternatives, it is necessary to focus on the substantive law of 
conspiracy, particularly the mens rea element. 
II. THE MODERN LAW OF CONSPIRACY 
Like all crimes, conspiracy is comprised of an act and an accom­
panying mental state, the mens rea.38 The agreement on a criminal 
objective is the act; the required mental state is the topic of some de­
bate. In their treatise on criminal law, Wayne LaFave and Austin 
Scott state that the mens rea for conspiracy is "the purpose of achiev­
ing a certain result."39 The M.P.C., in accord with LaFave and Scott, 
defines conspiracy as follows: 
(1) Definition of Conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with 
another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of 
promoting or facilitating its commission he: 
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one 
or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime 
or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or 
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning 
or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to com­
§ 2.02(7». For a discussion of the Court's use of the M.P.C. definition, see supra notes 25­
32 and accompanying text. 
37. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
2075 (1989) (membership in conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics); Kehm, 799 
F.2d at 362 (knowledge of criminal nature of a conspiracy to smuggle narcotics into the 
United States); United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1023 (2d Cir.) (knowledge of specific 
acts committed by the conspiracy), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986); United States V. Reed, 
790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.) (knowledge of specific acts committed by the conspiracy), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986). 
38. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(e) (2d ed. 1986). 
39. Id. 
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mit such crime.40 
Several other commentators agree that the mens rea for conspiracy is 
purpose, that is, a specific desire to further the criminal enterprise.41 
Most states have explicitly adopted the mens rea of purpose for 
conspiracy,.either by statute or by judicial fiat,42 although a handful of 
state statutes either require a different mens rea requirement or are 
ambiguous on the subject.43 Although no federal statute explicitly 
prescribes a level of mens rea for conspiracy, the Supreme Court has, 
in several key cases, clearly stated that the mens rea for conspiracy is 
intent to further the aims of the conspiracy.44 "Intent" is the 
equivalent of purpose under the M.P.C.4s 
Because the ostrich instruction equates deliberate ignorance with 
knowledge while the mens rea for conspiracy is intent to further the 
40. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 5.03(1) (1985) (emphasis added). 
·41. See Fridman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 MOD. L. REv. 276 (1956) (critical 
article cited by many courts that require proof of intent to further the criminal enterprise as 
the mens rea for conspiracy); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 624 
(1941) (arguing that any mens rea for conspiracy less than intent to further is nonsensical). 
42. See McCullough v. State, 40 Ala. App. 309, 113 So. 2d 905, 912, cert. denied,269 
Ala. 698, 113 So. 2d 912 (1959); State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604 (1980); 
Waits v. People, 724 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1986); State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 630 P.2d 665 
(1981); People v. Mordick, 94 Ill. App. 3d 497,418 N.E.2d 1057 (1981); Huffman v. State, 
543 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3257 (1990); State v. Linscott, 520 
A.2d 1067 (Me. 1987); State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975); see 
also ALA. CoDE § 13A-4-3(a) (1982); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(A) (1989); ARK. 
CoDE ANN. § 5-3-401 (1987); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-2-201(1) (West 1990); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-48a (1989); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 511-513 (1987); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 705-520 (Michie 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 
1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-2(a) (West 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 506.040(1) 
(MichielBobbs-MerrilI1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:26 (West 1986); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 151(1) (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.016(1) (Vernon 1979); MONT. 
CoDE ANN. § 45-4-102(1) (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-202 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 629:3(1) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2(a) (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 105.00-.17 (McKinney 1987); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2923.01(A) (Anderson 1987); 
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 161.450 (Butterworth 1990); 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 903 
(Purdon 1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02(a) (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-4-201 (1990); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 9A.28.040(I) (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 939.31 (West 1990). 
43. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04 (West 1976) (no explicit mens rea); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-13-33 ·(1988) (no explicit mens rea); IOWA CODE ANN. § 706.1 (West 1979) 
(ambiguous mens rea provision); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3302 (1988) (no explicit mens 
rea); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 12.1-06-04 (1985) (mens rea of knowledge); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 22-3-8 (1988) (ambiguous mens rea provision); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-22 
(1988) (ambiguous mens rea provision). 
44. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494 (1951); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944); United States v. Fal­
cone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940). 
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(12) (1985) states: .. 'intentionally' or 'with intent' 
means purposely." 
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conspiracy, use of the instruction in conspiracy prosecutions presents 
a danger that the jury will find a defendant guilty without finding the 
requisite mens rea. There is a meaningful difference between purpose 
and knowledge. The drafters of the M.P.C. described the difference as 
follows: "Knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is 
a common element in both conceptions. But action is not purposive 
with respect to the nature or result of the actor's conduct unless it was 
his conscious object to perform an action of that nature or to cause 
such a result."46 Thus, in a conspiracy case the prosecution must 
show that a defendant knew of the conspiracy and had the purpose of 
furthering its aims. If the ostrich instruction is carelessly worded, a 
jury could be misled, and improperly find that the defendant's deliber­
ate ignorance establishes his intent to further the conspiracy as well as 
his knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy. The Second and Sev­
enth Circuit Courts of Appeals have responded very differently to this 
danger. 
III. Two ApPROACHES TO THE USE OF THE OSTRICH 

INSTRUCTION IN CONSPIRACY CASES 

A. A Permissive Approach: United States v. Diaz47 
The defendants in Diaz were charged with conspiracy to possess 
and distribute cocaine.48 The conspiracy had six members, only one of 
whom challenged his conviction.49 On four separate dates, the con­
spiracy distributed cocaine. 50 On three of these dates, the conspiracy 
sold cocaine to an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration 
("DEA").51 After their arrest, Peirallo, Perez, Rodriguez and Carmen 
Diaz pleaded guilty, and the latter three testified as coconspirators at 
the trial of Reynaldo Diaz and Jose Pineiro. 
The prosecution's case against Reynaldo Diaz was based primar­
ily on the testimony of these witnesses. 52 The prosecution acknowl­
46. Id. § 2.02 commentary at 233. 
47. 864 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2075 (1989). 
48. Id. at 545. 
49. Gerardo Perez, Luis Rodriguez, David Peirallo, Jose Pineiro, Carmen Diaz and 
Reynaldo Diaz (no relation to Carmen) were all charged with conspiracy to possess and 
distribute cocaine. Id. The ostrich instruction was given in connection with Reynaldo 
Diaz. Id. Only Reynaldo Diaz appealed his conviction. Id. 
50. Id. The dates were July 23, 1987, August 21, 1987, September 3, 1987, and 
September 9, 1987. 
51. Id. at 546. 
52. Id. The facts of the case are complex. On July 23, Carmen Diaz and Perez sold 
cocaine to a DEA agent. The United States brought no evidence that Reynaldo Diaz was 
involved in this sale, and Carmen Diaz was not directly involved in the subsequent sales. 
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edged that Reynaldo Diaz was not present for any sale but the last. 53 
However, Perez testified that one sale took place near Diaz's house so 
that Diaz could see the buyer, and that he (perez) dropped the money 
off at Diaz's house afterwards. 54 Agents in the neighborhood, how­
ever, were unable to confirm the dropoff.55 There was testimony to the 
effect that Diaz was to be present for the September 9, 1987 sale of a 
kilogram of cocaine to CollinS.56 Diaz was not present at the sched­
uled location for the meeting with Perez and Rodriguez, but phone 
records demonstrated that the others called Diaz and spoke with 
him.57 Diaz was convicted in the district court. On appeal, Diaz chal­
lenged the use of the ostrich instruction. 58 The court of appeals up­
held the district court's use of the instruction. 59 
At trial, Diaz argued that while he was personally acquainted 
with some of the members of the conspiracy, he played no part in the 
group's illegal activities.60 Thus, Diaz argued not that he was ignorant 
of some or all of the conspirators' activities, but that he was not a 
member of the conspiracy at all. He did not testify, but introduced 
evidence of various types to support his contention.61 Diaz presented 
witnesses who stated that he was visiting friends in the area.62 He 
The evidence showed that Perez asked Rodriguez for help in getting started in the drug 
business, and Rodriguez arranged a meeting between hintself, Perez and Reynaldo Diaz, 
who agreed to supply Perez with drugs. On August 21, 1987 and September 3,1987, Perez 
. 	sold cocaine to DEA Agent Patricia Collins. Subsequently, Collins arranged to purchase a 
kilogram of cocaine from the conspiracy on September 9, 1987. Reynaldo Diaz was not 
present at the scheduled time and location of this sale, but phone records demonstrated 
that the others called and spoke with him. Soon after the call to Diaz, Peirallo arrived with 
the cocaine and Diaz arrived separately. Collins was an hour late, and Peirallo left the 
scene, asking to be paged when Collins arrived. Collins appeared soon after PeiraIlo left, 
and phone records indicated another call was made to Diaz. Perez went to Collins' caT to 
await Peira1lo, and soon thereafter Diaz sent Rodriguez to inform Collins that Peira1lo had 
arrived. Once all of the parties to the sale were present, the cars were lined up in this order: 
Peira1lo's, then Diaz's and fina1ly Collins'. Diaz then raised the hood of his car. Perez 
went to Peirallo's car to get the drugs, and Peirallo told Perez that he had a gun and 
intended to use it if necessary. During this conversation, Diaz and Rodriguez stood outside 
Diaz's car and watched Collins. Once Perez brought the drugs to Collins, she signaIled for 
the arrest. Id. at 545-46. 
53. Id. at 546. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. at 545-46. 
57. Id. at 546. 
58. [d. at 545, 549. Diaz also questioned whether PeiraIlo's use of a firearm was 
properly imputed to Diaz. The court found that the imputation was proper. Id. at 547-49. 
59. [d. at 550-51. 
60. [d. at 546. 
61. [d. at 546-47. 
62. [d. at 546. 
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claimed that the hood of his car was raised because he was experienc­
ing engine trouble, and that this was the reason for his presence at the 
scene of the arrest.63 Diaz stated, through counsel, that he had called 
a mechanic, and the mechanic testified that Diaz had called him. 64 
However, phone records did not support this claim.6s Before the 
judge gave his instructions to the jury, Diaz objected to the ostrich 
instruction that the government had submitted.66 The district court 
allowed the instruction, and Diaz was subsequently convicted. On ap­
peal, Diaz again raised his objection to the instruction. 
Diaz argued that the ostrich instruction was inappropriately used 
in his case.67 The precise nature of his objection is not clear from the 
opinion of the court of appeals, but apparently Diaz argued that the 
facts did not support an inference of deliberate avoidance of knowl­
edge.68 Rather, he argued, the facts could support two interpreta­
tions--either Diaz actually and directly knew of the conspiracy or he 
had no knowledge of it.69 The court, citing precedent in the Seventh 
Circuit70 and expressly disapproving of a holding in a similar Second 
Circuit case,71 held that the instruction was applicable to conspiracy 
cases, and that it was properly given in Diaz's case. 72 
Thus, after Diaz, the Seventh Circuit has allowed the use of the 
ostrich instruction in connection with proof of the defendant's mem­
bership in a conspiracy. 
B. A Restrictive Approach: United States v. Mankani 73 
The defendants in Mankani were charged with conspiracy to pos­
63. Id. at 546-47. The prosecution argued that the raised hood duplicated a "stan­
dard method by which drug dealers prevent their buyers from seeing the supplier of the 
drugs." Id. at 546. 
64. Id. at 547. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 549. 
68. See id. at 550-51. The court focused on the facts of Diaz as compared with those 
of other cases in which they had allowed the ostrich instruction. Also, the court cited 
evidence which supported the inference of deliberate ignorance in Diaz's case: his presence 
at the scene of the fourth sale, his raising the hood of his car, which aided the sale, and his 
absence from the other transactions. Id. at 551. 
69. Id. at 550-51. 
70. Id. (citing United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986». 
71. Id. at 549 (citing United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984». 
72. Id. at 551. 
73. 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984). Because the defendants in Mankani were tried 
before the bench, no jury instructions were given. However, the prosecution applied the 
conscious avoidance theory to one of the defendants in Mankani, and the court used that 
theory to convict that defendant. Id. at 547. 
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sess and distribute marijuana. Nine individuals were charged with in­
volvement at several levels with various aspects of the conspiracy.74 
The district court applied the conscious avoidance theory to only one 
defendant, Sally Edith.7s 
After receiving notice of the conspiracy's drug smuggling enter­
prise, the DEA began surveillance.76 A DEA agent went to the hotel 
where Mankani and Hamirani were staying, and was able to conduct 
aural surveillance through a hole in the wall.77 One of the officers 
conducting the aural surveillance testified that at one point Mankani 
complained that six people were extracting the hashish, and that he 
would have to pay all of them.78 If six people were working, Edith 
must have been one of them, since there were only five others, Mac­
Farlane, Sturgeon, Fortin, Raxlen and Norris, present at the barn. 
The officer also testified that Mankani complained of "a girl hanging 
around."79 
While the aural surveillance continued, another agent placed a 
tracking device on MacFarlane's car, and the police later followed 
74. [d. at 540-41. The defendants were Mohan Mankani, Kenneth Norris, Joseph 
Fortin, Peter MacFarlane, Gilles Stanton, William Sturgeon, Harold Raxlen, Nizarali 
Hamirani and Sally Edith. 
75. Id. at 547. The facts of Mankani involve several defendants, and a long chain of 
activities. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP") first suspected two of the con­
spirators, Canadians MacFarlane and Stanton, of planning to import hashish into Canada. 
The RCMP began close observation of the two men in late spring of 1982, and obtained a 
court order to monitor the phone calls of the two. During the summer of 1982, nearly two 
tons of hashish arrived in Houston, Texas from India, contained in eight seven-foot-long 
steel tubes, weighing approximately 500 pounds each. These tubes were subsequently flown 
to John F. Kennedy International Airport on a commercial freight carrier. Several of the 
conspirators were waiting for the tubes, but Edith was not among them. On Wednesday, 
September 8, MacFarlane picked up the tubes at a warehouse. He had rented a forklift, 
and used it to load the tubes into a truck, also rented. MacFarlane then drove the truck to 
a small farm in Bakersfield, Vermont, where Edith and her boyfriend, defendant Joseph 
Fortin, lived. Edith and Fortin rented the house on the farm; Fortin also rented a portion 
of the small bam as a potting studio. Fortin had rented several pieces of heavy equipment 
to be used to open the tubeS. Two other defendants, Kenneth Norris and Harold Raxlen, 
arrived with a hydraulic press to aid in the opening of the tubes. Another defendant, Wil­
liam Sturgeon, also assisted in removing the hashish from the tubes. Edith did not go to 
her regular job the day after MacFarlane arrived. On September 10, two other conspira­
tors, Mohan Mankani and Nizarali Hamirani, flew to Burlington, Vermont and checked 
into a hotel. Mankani then called Stanton. The RCMP intercepted this call and notified 
the DEA and the Vermont State Police. This call led to the surveillance which in tum led 
to the arrests. Id. at 541-42; Brief for Appellant at 3-20, Mankani (No. 83-1303). 
76. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 541. 
77. [d. 
78. Brief for Appellant at 17, Mankani (No. 83-1303). 
79. Id. 
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MacFarlane by car and helicopter to the Bakersfield farm.80 The 
agent and police conducted visual surveillance of the house and 
bam.81 At trial, one of the officers who had conducted the surveil­
lance of the house testified that Edith had gone out to the mailbox, 
gone back to the house, reemerged in a bathing suit, gone for a short 
swim in a pond on the farm property, then returned to the house.82 
This agent also stated that during his entire surveillance, while he was 
stationed 150 yards from the barn, he could hear the loud grinding 
noise produced by the tools the defendants were using to extract the 
hashish from its containers.83 The house Edith shared with Fortin 
was forty feet from the bam.84 The DEA later sought and obtained a 
search warrant for the house and bam, which authorized a search for 
"hashish, invoice records, proceeds, processing tools, and other docu­
mentary evidence of the illegal drug operation."8s The DEA executed 
the warrant on September 14, seized evidence and arrested Edith, 
Sturgeon, Norris, Raxlen, and MacFarlane.86 Fortin later responded 
to a summons, and Mankani was arrested at the hotel. 87 
Sally Edith challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against her, 
and argued that the government had not proved her guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.88 The district court judge, acting as trier of fact, 
found her guilty of conspiracy.89 The prosecution attempted to prove 
Edith's participation in the conspiracy on the basis of eight pieces of 
circumstantial evidence.90 The evidence included: first, that Edith 
was one of the two renters of the house; second, that she lived with 
Fortin; third, that she missed work the day after MacFarlane arrived 
with the hashish; fourth, that on the same day, Fortin leased the 
equipment to open the tubes which contained the hashish; fifth, that 
agents saw Edith in the house during the opening of the tubes; sixth, 
that the agent stationed 150 yards from the bam heard the noise from 
80. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 542. 
81. [d. 
82. Brief for Appellant at 20, Mankani (No. 83-1303). 
83. [d. at 17-18. 
84. [d. 
85. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1984). 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. In addition to Edith's challenge, Mankani and MacFarlane challenged the 
aural surveillance of the hotel room, arguing that it constituted an unreasonable search in 
violation of the fourth amendment. All of the defendants challenged the search warrant for 
the bam, claiming that it was issued without a showing of probable cause, but only Fortin 
had standing to raise this challenge. Both challenges failed. Id. at 545-46. 
89. [d. at 540-41. 
90. [d. at 546-47. 
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the machinery, so Edith must have heard it while she was in the house, 
on1y 40 yards from the barn; seventh, that Edith wa1ked to the 
mailbox and back to the house, thereby coming even closer to the 
barn; and eighth, that she later took a short swim and proceeded back 
to the house, again passing close to the bam.91 The government ar­
gued on appeal, and apparently at trial as well, that this evidence 
either established Edith's participation in the conspiracy or at least 
proved that she consciously avoided knowledge of the conspiracy.92 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the evidence insuf­
ficient to prove Edith's participation in the conspiracy.93 The court 
also stated that the conscious avoidance theory was inappropriate: 
"This [conscious avoidance] argument is totally illogical. How can a 
person consciously avoid participating in a conspiracy and also be a 
member of the conspiracy? The two notions are obviously mutually 
exclusive."94 The court also noted that the conscious avoidance in­
struction is only appropriate where the "essential mental element of 
the crime is 'guilty knowledge.' "95 Finally, the court stated that the 
required mental state for conspiracy is intent.96 For these reasons, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government had im­
properly applied the deliberate ignorance theory to Edith. Since the 
Mankani decision, the Second Circuit has clarified its position, and 
stated that the conscious avoidance theory, and instructions based 
upon that theory, cannot be used to prove that a defendant was a 
member of a conspiracy. 97 
91. Id. 
92. Id. The government must have made the conscious avoidance argument at the 
bench trial, because it could not have raised the argument for the first time on appeal. 
93. Id. at 547. 
94. Id. (emphasis in original). 
95. Id. at 547 n.l (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 951 (1976»; United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
821 (1973); United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1971). 
96. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 547 n.l (citing United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 
1983), and W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 61 (2d ed. 1972». 
97. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1021 (2d Cir.) (ostrich instruction per­
missible if the defendant claims lack of knowledge of specific illegal acts of conspiracy), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986); United States V. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.) (os­
trich instruction permissible if the defendant claims lack of knowledge of specific illegal 
acts of conspiracy), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986). However, the Supreme Court has 
also clarified the standards for the use of coconspirator's hearsay evidence, such that, if 
Mankani were heard today, the evidence against Edith would be admitted. See Bourjaily V. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987) (such evidence admissible under preponderance 
standard, and judge not bound by any of the Federal Rules of Evidence other than privilege 
in making his or her determination of admissibility). Under Bourjaily, the government 
cannot be required to prove a conspirator's participation in the conspiracy by a preponder­
. ance of the nonhearsay evidence before hearsay statements of coconspirators are admitted. 
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C. Other Cases Decided Under the Two Approaches 
Three other cases decided under the two approaches to deliberate 
ignorance in conspiracy cases highlight the precise differences between 
them. In some types of conspiracy cases, the Seventh and Second Cir­
cuits agree that the instruction should be allowed. The circuits' pri­
mary disagreement is over the use of the deliberate ignorance theory in 
proving a defendant's membership in a conspiracy. 
The Second Circuit clarified its position on the use of the con­
scious avoidance instruction in two cases that came before it after 
Mankani: United States v. Reed 98 and United States v. Lanza.99 In 
Reed, the defendant was involved in a conspiracy to ship protective 
garments for use in chemical warfare to Iran in violation of a statutory 
embargo. 1OO The defendant argued that he was involved with the ex­
port scheme but did not know that the destination of the garments was 
Iran. 101 Relying on Mankani, Reed argued on appeal that the ostrich 
instruction given at his trial was reversible error. 102 The court held 
that the reasoning in Mankani prohibited the use of the ostrich in­
struction only in cases where the defendant's membership in the con­
spiracy is at issue. 103 In Reed, where the defendant conceded 
membership in the conspiracy, the court held that the ostrich instruc­
tion was proper. 104 
The defendant in United States v. Lanza was accused of conspir­
acy to commit wire fraud. lOS The defendant argued, similarly to the 
defendant in Reed, that while he was involved in the group's activities, 
he believed that he was helping to commit extortion, not wire fraud. 106 
On appeal, he similarly attacked the ostrich instruction given at his 
trial, arguing that it could not be used in conspiracy cases.107 Again, 
the court held that the Mankani approach only forbids the ostrich 
Thus, the hearsay statements offered against Edith would be admissible if a preponderance 
of the evidence showed that the statements themselves met the requirements of the cocon­
spirator's exception to the hearsay rule, regardless of the other evidence offered. The hold­
ing in Bourjai/y has no effect on the Second Circuit's approach to the deliberate ignorance 
issue in conspiracy cases, but more of the evidence against her would have been admissible. 
98. 790 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986). 
99. 790 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986). 
100. Reed, 790 F.2d at 209. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 211. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. United States V. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 
(1986). 
106. Id. at 1018. 
107. Id. at 1020. 
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instruction in conspiracy cases if the defendant's membership in the 
conspiracy is in dispute. 108 The court held that once a defendant ad­
mits his involvement with the conspiring group, as the defendant did 
in Lanza, the ostrich instruction is appropriate if the defendant claims 
ignorance of specific acts of the conspiracy.l09 Thus, in both cases the 
Second Circuit held that once the government had proved member­
ship in the conspiracy by actual intent, the ostrich instruction may be 
given in connection with the defendant's knowledge of specific crimi­
nal acts of the enterprise. 110 However, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals preserved the distinction between membership and specific 
acts, and stated that the conscious avoidance instruction cannot be 
given in connection with proof of membership in a conspiracy.lll 
After the Second Circuit's decision in Mankani, a defendant in 
United States v. Kehm,112 a conspiracy case in the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, attempted to use the reasoning in Mankani to object 
to an ostrich instruction which had been given in his case. 113 How­
ever, the defendant in Kehm did not claim that he was not a member 
of the conspiracy. In fact, he admitted that he was involved in some 
way with the activities of those charged with conspiracy.1l4 Rather, 
he argued, and brought evidence that tended to show, that he did not 
know of the conspiracy's drug smuggling operation. lIS The court re­
jected the defendant's argument, which was based on Mankani, and 
stated of the reasoning in Mankani itself: "[T]he point is unexception­
able; one cannot be a conspirator yet consciously avoid being a con­
spirator. To avoid being a conspirator is to be innocent of conspiracy. 
But this is not how an ostrich instruction is used in conspiracy 
cases."1l6 The court noted that the defendant in Kehm, Steven Green­
berg, had actually helped to set up the corporation through which the 
108. Id. af 1022. 
109. Id. at 1022-23. 
110. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 
(1986); United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 
(1986). 
Ill. Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1015; Reed, 790 F.2d at 211. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit has recently followed this approach in a case involving the crime of knowingly 
renting property for the purpose of unlawfully storing, distributing and using a controlled 
substance. United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1990). In Chen, the Fifth 
Circuit invalidated the defendant's conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(I), a crime with an 
explicit mens rea of intent, because the district court gave a deliberate ignorance (ostrich) 
instruction without a further instruction on mens rea. Id. at 190-91. 
112. 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986). 
113. Id. at 362. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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conspiracy later engaged in the smuggling. 117 A coconspirator testi­
fied that Greenberg left one of the group's meetings when a discussion 
of the use of the plane began, and stated that "he didn't want to hear 
about it."118 The court cited this and other facts as indicative of 
Greenberg'S probable deliberate ignorance, and upheld the trial 
judge's use of the ostrich instruction. 119 
The court could have upheld the instruction and still recognized 
the Second Circuit's distinction between the defenses of nonmember­
ship and ignorance of specific acts. Greenberg's defense went only to 
specific acts. Thus, even the Second Circuit would have allowed the 
ostrich instruction in Kehm. Instead, the court in Kehm chose lan­
guage that made it unclear whether it accepted the distinction: "We 
have sustained conspiracy convictions in cases in which ostrich in­
structions were given and we hold that in a conspiracy prosecution it 
is permissible to give an ostrich instruction as part of the definition of 
knowledge ...."120 In using this language, the Seventh Circuit did 
not clearly state whether it accepted the Second Circuit's distinction 
between proof of knowledge of specific acts once membership has been 
proved, and proof of membership itself. The Seventh Circuit's subse­
quent decision in Diaz relied on the ambiguous holding in Kehm.l2l 
IV. 	 ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ApPROACHES, AND PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
The main purpose of equating deliberate ignorance with knowl­
edge, and of giving a jury instruction based on this equation, is to pre­
vent a guilty defendant from escaping punishment by avoiding 
knowledge of one or two key facts.122 The notion behind the theory is 
that the defendant is in fact guilty, and his ability to determine which 
knowledge to avoid demonstrates that he in fact did possess the re­
quired knowledge. 123 The key question, which the Second and Sev­
enth Circuits answer differently, is whether this notion makes sense in 
a case where the accused defends against a charge of conspiracy by 
claiming he was not a member of the conspiracy. The Second Circuit 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. (citations omitted). 
121. United States'v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544,550 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
2075 (1989). 
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary passim (1985); see also Robbins, 
supra note 22, at 196-98. Robbins ultimately concludes that deliberate ignorance should be 
viewed as the equivalent of recklessness, not knowledge. Id. at 231-34. 
123. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2,02 commentary passim (1985). 
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allows the use of the ostrich instruction in conspiracy cases only if 
membership can be independently established. 124 The Seventh Circuit 
allows the ostrich instruction in connection with membership or spe­
cific acts of the conspiracy, and does not require independent proof of 
a defendant's membership.12s It is this difference that must be 
analyzed. 
A. The Ostrich Instruction and the Mens Rea for Conspiracy 
The ostrich instruction equates deliberate ignorance with knowl­
edge. 126 Thus, an ostrich instruction that requires no proof of mental 
state beyond conscious avoidance should only be used in connection 
with crimes for which the required mental state is knowledge or some 
lesser mens rea. When the crime charged requires that the prosecu­
tion prove that the defendant acted with a specific purpose, a care­
lessly worded ostrich instruction may give the jury the impression that 
the defendant's willful blindness establishes not only his guilty knowl­
edge, but his purpose as well. Therefore, although the instruction may 
be relevant to proof of guilt of a crime which requires a mental state 
greater than knowledge, it should never be given in connection with 
such a crime without a clear explanation that such knowledge alone is 
not enough to convict the defendant. 127 
A concrete example will help to demonstrate the distinction be­
tween the two levels of mens rea. Suppose the defendant is charged 
with receiving stolen property under the Model Penal Code, which 
provides that a person is guilty of this crime if he "purposely receives 
. . . movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it has probably been stolen."128 His defense is that he 
did not know or believe that the property was stolen. Under the 
124. See United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
861 (1986); United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 
(1986); United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 (2d. Cir. 1984). 
125. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 551; United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
126. See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text. 
127. Proof of a defendant's knowledge or deliberate ignorance does have evidentiary 
value even if the prosecution must also prove that the defendant acted intentionally. If the 
prosecution shows that a defendant had knowledge or the equivalent of knowledge of the 
conspiracy, it becomes more likely that the defendant was involved with the conspiracy and 
intended to further it. This meets the standard of relevancy required by the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, which provide: .. 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401 
(emphasis added). 
128. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 223.6 (1985). 
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M.P.C.'s definition of receiving stolen property, the defendant in this 
example has conceded that he received the property and does not 
claim that he did so accidentally. Thus, he has conceded that he acted 
purposely. Only the defendant's knowledge is at issue. If the prosecu­
tor can prove that the defendant in fact knew that the property he 
received was stolen, his defense is negated, and he must be found 
guilty. In this context, the ostrich instruction is a powerful and legiti­
mate weapon for the prosecutor: the defendant claims that he didn't 
know the property was stolen; the prosecutor demonstrates that the 
defendant deliberately avoided finding out certain facts, for example, 
the source of the goods, that would have led the defendant to the 
knowledge that the goods were stolen. If one accepts the equating of 
deliberate ignorance with knowledge, the defendant is guilty. His only 
defense is his lack of knowledge; and the prosecutor has proved that 
the defendant possessed the equivalent of that knowledge. The ostrich 
instruction is designed to prevent a defendant in this type of case from 
avoiding liability. 
Now, suppose that the defendant is charged with arson under the 
M.P.C. in connection with the destruction of a building. The statute 
provides that a person is guilty of arson "if he starts a fire or causes an 
explosion with the purpose of . . . destroying a building or occupied 
structure of another." 129 His defense is that he did not intend to de­
stroy the building. In this case, proof that the defendant knew that his 
conduct would lead to the destruction of the building does not prove 
him guilty of arson in the absence of proof of a purpose to destroy the 
building. To give the ostrich instruction in this case without any other 
instruction on mens rea could lead a jury to the erroneous conclusion 
that the defendant's deliberate ignorance about the fact that his con­
duct would destroy the building also establishes that the defendant 
intended to destroy the building. Proof of knowledge or its equivalent 
should not be enough to convict this defendant of arson under the 
M.P.C. 
Similarly, in a conspiracy case, the appropriateness of the ostrich 
instruction depends on the level of mens rea the government is re­
quired to prove and the defense offered. Therefore, a court must de­
termine the required mental state for conspiracy before deciding 
whether, and in what form, to give the ostrich instruction. 
The statutory scheme under which Diaz and Edith were charged 
provides no clear indication of the requisite mental state. 130 Thus, the 
129. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 220. 1(a) (1985). 
130. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 § 406 (codi­
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matter is left to the courts, and arguably, knowledge could be the mens 
rea under the statute. Many authorities, however, agree that intent is 
the requisite state of mind for conspiracy, at least for entrance into the 
agreement. 131 The lack of an explicit mens rea in the statute under 
which Diaz was charged gives apparent judicial discretion on a matter 
that is, in fact, fairly settled. 132 
While the majority of authorities and jurisdictions have found 
that the mens rea for conspiracy is purpose or intent, it is difficult to 
determine exactly what this means in the context of a crime that may 
involve no overt acts other than entrance into an agreement. The Diaz 
decision raises a crucial question: the importance of the alleged con­
spirator's knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy in proving that 
the defendant had the requisite mens rea. In analyzing this problem, it 
is helpful to break the mens rea for conspiracy into two constituent 
elements: knowledge to the existen~ of the conspiracy and its illegal 
objectives and a purpose to further that conspiracy's objectives. 133 
This approach merely points out the obvious: a defendant must know 
of the conspiracy and its illegal objectives if he or she intends to fur­
ther these objectives. If the prosecution proves that the defendant 
joined the conspiracy with the purpose of furthering its aims, the pros­
ecution has also proven the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy. 
However, if only the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy is estab­
lished, the prosecution must still prove that the defendant acted with 
the purpose of furthering the objectives of the conspiracy. 
Under the two part approach to the mens rea for conspiracy, the 
potential problem with the use of the ostrich instruction in these cases 
becomes clearer.· In cases in which the defendant argues only that he 
or she did not know of the conspiracy's unlawful activities, the in­
struction is proper, without elaboration. Only the defendant's knowl­
edge is at issue. But, in cases such as Diaz, the defendant argues that 
he or she had no connection, legal or illegal, with the conspiracy. In 
such cases, the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the conspir­
acy and its aims is merely evidence which tends to discredit his or her 
defense. The defendant's knowledge makes it more likely that he or 
fled as amended at 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1988» provides: "Any person who attempts or con­
spires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same 
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the 
attempt or conspiracy." 
131. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra notes 37-45, 121 and accompanying text. 
133. This approach is suggested in Harno, supra note 41, at 633, and in the Model 
Penal Code commentaries. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 5.03 commentary at 405 (1985). 
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she was involved in the conspiracy and intended to further it. Such 
knowledge can support an inference that the defendant must have 
been involved in some way with the members of the conspiracy in or­
der to acquire the knowledge. 134 However, this knowledge is not 
equivalent to an intent to further the aims of the conspiracy. Giving 
an ostrich instruction in this type of case could have the effect of de­
priving the defendant of his or her non-involvement defense, unless the 
court also gives a cautionary instruction that the prosecution must 
also prove the defendant's intent to further the conspiracy. 
The Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have re- ­
sponded very differently to this potential problem. In Mankani, the 
Second Circuit explicitly stated that the mens rea for conspiracy is 
intent, and disallowed the conscious avoidance theory in cases where 
the defendant raised the non-involvement defense. 13s The Seventh 
Circuit allowed the ostrich instruction in Diaz, but without ever ex­
plicitly considering the question of mens rea. The Diaz court also did 
not acknowledge that giving an ostrich instruction, without a further 
cautionary instruction on mens rea, could allow a conviction for con­
spiracy even when the government failed to prove that the defendant 
had the requisite intent to further the conspiracy.136 In this situation 
there are two issues: the defendant's knowledge of the acts of the con­
spiracy and his or her intent to further the conspiracy. The ostrich 
instruction, used injudiciously, tends to collapse the two issues, and 
this collapsing, in turn, could have the effect of depriving the defend­
ant of a legitimate defense. The Second Circuit approach recognizes 
this concern; the Seventh Circuit does not make the connection be­
tween the mens rea for conspiracy and the appropriateness of the os­
trich instruction. 
In Diaz, the Seventh Circuit seems to equate the defense of non­
membership with a defense of lack of knowledge of the conspiracy's 
activities. 137 As justification for upholding the use of the instruction, 
the court states: 
Here, the trial record contained ample evidence to support the infer­
ence that the defendant's modus operandi was to insulate himself 
from the actual drug transaction so that he could deny knowledge 
of it. During the other observed transactions, he had absented him­
self from the scene. On this occasion, [the final sale to DEA Agent 
134. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
135. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.l (2d Cir. 1984). 
136. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
2075 (1989). 
137. Id. at 55l. 
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Collins, at which the arrests took place] while [the defendant was] 
present, he argued that he was preoccupied with his disabled vehicle 
and did not know that he was standing in the middle of his friends' 
drug transaction. 138 
The only evidence of Diaz's involvement in the prior sales was based 
On the testimony of his coconspirators, admitted under the coconspira­
tors' exception to the hearsay rule. 139 None of the evidence cited by 
the court speaks directly to Diaz's defense, which was that he was not 
a member of the conspiracy at all. 14O The jury could choose to believe 
either Diaz's version of events or that of the government's witnesses; 
One account must have been false. Diaz's defense-that he was not a 
member of the conspiracy-only makes sense if the jury believed his 
version of these events. That is, that he was completely uninvolved in 
the first three sales, and was on the scene of the fourth only because of 
car trouble. 141 If the jury believed Diaz, they believed that he was an 
innocent bystander to the conspiracy. Arguably, the ostrich instruc­
tion makes some sense under this scenario, because an inference of 
deliberate ignorance could cast doubt on Diaz's story. A jury could 
find that Diaz's ability to avoid learning of certain facts indicated a 
familiarity with the conspiracy's activities. This familiarity, in turn, 
may make it more probable that Diaz was a member of the conspiracy. 
Without a further instruction indicating that deliberate ignorance 
alone is not enough to prove the defendant guilty, however, the ostrich 
instruction may have the effect of negating Diaz's defense. That is, the 
jury may find that Diaz deliberately avoided learning about the COn­
spiracy and find him guilty based On this equivalent of knowledge 
alone. The jury might not understand the need to find that Diaz in­
tended to further the conspiracy.142 
However, if the jury believed the version of events given by the 
coconspirators, Diaz had nO defense; he was not only a member of the 
conspiracy, he was One of its leaders, and had actual knowledge of the 
conspiracy resulting from his participation in the conspiracy. Under 
the coconspirators' version of events, Diaz's defense is a lie, and the 
ostrich instruction is both unnecessary and nonsensical. 143 Thus, Diaz 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 545-46. 
140. Id. at 550-51. 
141. Id. 
142. See supra note III and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's 
approach to this problem in another context. 
143. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 2075 (1989). 
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argued on appeal that neither his version of events nor that of the 
government's witnesses supported an inference that he deliberately 
avoided knowledge of the conspiracy.144 Under the two versions of 
events offered to the jury, Diaz had either actual knowledge or no 
knowledge. The ostrich instruction, given without further clarifica­
tion, is inappropriate under either scenario. 
In upholding the instruction in spite of Diaz's defense of non­
membership, the Seventh Circuit allowed the instruction in a case 
which is more similar to Mankani than to Kehm. In Kehm, the court 
allowed an ostrich instruction in a conspiracy case in which the de­
fendant claimed that he was ignorant only of the conspiracy's criminal 
activities. 14s Unlike Diaz, the defendant in Kehm never argued that he 
was completely uninvolved with the alleged conspirators and their ac­
tivities. In allowing the use of the ostrich instruction in Diaz, the Sev­
enth Circuit went beyond the holding in Kehm, without 
acknowledging that it had done SO.146 
Looking at the probable result in Mankani had it been decided 
under the Seventh Circuit approach makes it easier to see the dangers 
involved in careless use of the ostrich instruction in conspiracy 
cases. 147 The jury would have heard the evidence of Edith's proximity 
to the sounds of the illegal activity in the barn, the fact that she lived 
with one of the conspirators and a description of her behavior on the 
day of the arrests. 148 Then, the judge would have given the ostrich 
instruction, thereby telling the jury that if they found that Edith had 
deliberately shut her eyes to certain facts for fear of what she would 
learn, she in fact knew of the conspiracy. If this was the extent of the 
charge on mens rea, Edith could have been found guilty of conspiracy 
on evidence that established nothing more than her proximity to a 
conspiracy. In order to safeguard against such results, the Second Cir­
cuit forbids the use of the instruction altogether in conspiracy prosecu­
tions in which the defendant's membership in the conspiracy is at 
lssue. 
Yet in doing so, the court perhaps goes too far. It protects a de­
fendant's right to raise the defense of nonmembership, but undervalues 
the potential that a finding of deliberate ignorance has for damaging 
144. Id. 
145. United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 112-121 
and accompanying text for a discussion of Kehm. 
146. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 551. 
147. For a discussion of Mankani, see supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text. 
148. For a description of the circumstantial evidence against Edith in Mankani, see 
supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
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the credibility of the defense of nonmembership in the conspiracy. 
The court thereby undervalues the significant policy concerns that un­
derlie conspiracy law. 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit errs on the prosecution's side, and does 
not closely examine the use of the ostrich instruction in Diaz. On the 
other hand, the Second Circuit errs on the side of the defendant, and 
forbids the use of the instruction altogether in cases like Mankani. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals thereby deprives the prosecution 
of a useful tool. Rather than balancing the two concerns at issue, each 
court chooses an all-or-nothing approach. 
B. 	 Analysis of the Two Competing Concerns: Dangers to Society 
from Conspiracy and Confusion Caused by the Ostrich 
Instruction 
A defendant can be punished under conspiracy law although his 
or her crime is still in the planning stage. This punishment is justified 
by the unusual danger to society which group behavior presents. 149 
These dangers include greater likelihood of success, the ability to carry 
out more complex illegal acts, the increased likelihood of repeat of­
fenses and patterns of crime, and other dangers. ISO In part because of 
these dangers, the prosecutor in a conspiracy case has several advan­
tages not normally present in a criminal trial. First, conspiracy stat­
utes are often quite vague, and allow for a great deal of latitude in 
what a prosecutor must prove. lSI In addition, the coconspirator ex­
ception to the hearsay rule allows the prosecutor to put statements by 
one conspirator into evidence against all parties to the conspiracy.ls2 
The courts have construed the exception broadly, thereby increasing 
the prosecutor's advantage. IS3 Thus, evidence that would be inadmis­
sible in a prosecution for a substantive criminal offense is admissible in 
conspiracy cases. Several other prosecutorial advantages, less directly 
relevant to the use of the ostrich instruction, also obtain in conspiracy 
trials. IS4 In light of these advantages, perhaps the dangers of conspir­
149. 	 See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). 
150. 	 Id. at 594-95. 
151. 	 See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOlT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(1). 
152. 	 Id. § 6.4(b)(3) (citing J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1079, (1972». 
153. 	 See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOlT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(3). 
154. The prosecutor has the right to try all conspirators in any district where any 
one of them committed any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Hyde & Schneider 
v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1912). Also, courts have allowed conspiracy con­
victions based upon circumstantial evidence, even if only loosely relevant. w. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOlT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(4) (citing several cases in which such evidence is admit­
ted under the rationale that more direct proof of conspiracy is difficult to obtain, e.g., 
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acy are adequately addressed, and there is no need for the expansive 
use of the ostrich instruction typified by Diaz. 
Still, since the leaders of conspiracies often create elaborate net­
works of assistants in order to limit the leaders' criminal liability, the 
ostrich instruction may be an important and useful prosecutorial tool 
even in a case like Diaz or Mankani. A defendant's deliberate igno­
rance, and the inference of knowledge that it supports, can cast doubt 
on his or her claim that he or she was not involved in the conspiracy. 
Yet the use of the ostrich instruction in cases where the defend­
ant's membership in the conspiracy is at issue is arguably inconsistent 
with the mens rea for conspiracy: intent to further the conspiracy's 
objectives. ISS Because the deliberate ignorance instruction can ulti­
mately be traced to Model Penal Code section 2.02(7), one authority 
for evaluating the appropriateness of the instruction in conspiracy 
cases is the M.P.C.'s conspiracy statute. 1S6 The drafters ofthis statute 
clearly required a mental state greater than knowledge for proof of 
conspiracy, "with the purpose of promoting or facilitating [the planned 
crime's] commission."ls7 Thus, the M.P.C. requires that the defend­
ant enter into the agreement to conspire with the purpose of furthering 
the criminal act which is the focus of the conspiracy. ISS Section 
2.02(7), the basis for the deliberate ignorance theory of liability, ap­
plies to crimes for which knowledge is the requisite mental state. 1S9 
Guilty knowledge is relevant to extending the conspirator's guilt to 
acts committed by coconspirators on behalf of the conspiracy, but only 
after the defendant's purposeful agreement to conspire has been estab­
lished. l60 Thus, the drafters of the M.P.C. never intended 'that the 
deliberate ignorance theory be applied to membership in a conspiracy, 
because under the M.P.C., a defendant must enter into the agreement 
purposely. 161 
------------------------------------------------------ I 
United States v. Garelle, 438 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 967 (1971); 
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 168 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 613 (1949». 
The prosecution may try all coconspirators together, and deprive the defendants of their 
right to separate trials. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(5). Thejustifica­
tion for the joint trial is the need to have all defendants present at a single proceeding in 
order to establish a clear and complete picture of all steps of the conspiracy. Id. Overall, 
the prosecution enjoys unique advantages in conspiracy trials. 
155. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. 
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 40 for 
the text of § 5.03(1). 
157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985) (emphasis added). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. § 2.02(7). See supra note 21 for the text of § 2.02(7). 
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(2), (3) (1985). 
161. Id. § 5.03(1). 
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A close reading of the Model Penal Code, then, supports the Sec­
ond Circuit approach. First, the M.P.C.'s conspiracy statute162 states 
that the mens rea for the agreement, the act of conspiracy, is purpose. 
This is equivalent to the mental state the Second Circuit requires, in­
tent. 163 Second, the statute as a whole makes a distinction between the 
initial agreement, which the defendant must enter into purposely, and 
the defendant's liability for acts undertaken by the conspiracy once he 
or she has joined it, which may be proved by knowledge. 164 The Sec­
ond Circuit makes the same distinction in Reed 165 and Lanza,166 al­
lowing the ostrich instruction in connection with knowledge of specific 
acts of the conspiracy once the defendant's intentional membership in 
the conspiracy is established. 167 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's approach is, at best, uncon­
cerned with the mens rea issue. The Diaz court never explicitly con­
fronts the question of whether the mens rea for conspiracy is 
knowledge or intent. The court ignores the issue, and its potential 
implications for the use of the ostrich instruction, focusing instead on 
the dangers to society of conspiracy. 
Thus, there are two concerns involved in using the ostrich in­
struction in conspiracy cases where the defendant's membership is at 
issue. The Seventh Circuit chooses to focus on the dangers of conspir­
acy; the Second Circuit focuses instead on the inconsistencies between 
the mens rea for conspiracy and the ostrich instruction. A better ap­
proach would attempt to balance the two interests. 
C. Balancing the Interests: A Cautionary Instruction 
The two approaches discussed in the previous section do not at­
tempt to balance the competing interests that both courts acknowledge 
are present. A cautionary instruction on mens rea, which a judge 
would give after the ostrich instruction in conspiracy cases like Diaz 
and Mankani, would address both concerns. 
The instruction would, in effect, divide the mens rea for conspir­
162. Id. § 5.03. 
163. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984). The Model 
Penal Code explicitly equates intent and purpose in its general definitions. MODEL PENAL 
CoDE § 1.13(12) (1985). 
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)-(3) (1985). 
165. United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 
(1986). 
166. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1021 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 
(1986). 
167. Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1021; Reed, 790 F.2d at 211. 
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acy into two constituent parts. 168 First, the judge would give an os­
trich instruction, similar to that given in Diaz: 
You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and 
indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong 
suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone 
had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of 
what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted knowingly 
169 
Then, to make it clear that knowledge alone does not establish the 
defendant's guilt, the judge would give a further instruction, clarifying 
the difference between knowledge and intent to further the conspiracy. 
The instruction should initially explain the role that knowledge and 
intent play in a conspiracy. The instruction should then state clearly 
that knowledge and intent, not knowledge alone, are required. Fi­
nally, the instruction should specify that deliberate ignorance can be 
evidence of intent, but does not on its own establish intent. This in­
struction, given after the ostrich instruction above, might be worded as 
follows: 
However, a finding of knowledge alone is not enough to find the 
defendant guilty of conspiracy. The government must also prove 
that the defendant acted intentionally. You may find that the de­
fendant acted intentionally if you find that he [she] acted with the 
conscious objective or desire to help the conspiracy achieve its aims. 
You must find both that he [she] knew about the conspiracy and 
that he [she] intended to join it and aid it. If you find only that the 
defendant knew of the conspiracy, or deliberately avoided learning 
of it, you cannot find that he [she] acted intentionally.17o 
Such an instruction would allow the prosecution to make use of the 
inferences that the jury might draw from the defendant's deliberate 
ignorance. But, it would minimize the danger that a defendant would 
be convicted of conspiracy without a showing of the requisite intent. 
The jury would be instructed that knowledge alone does not establish 
guilt. This approach would combine the benefits of both the Second 
and the Seventh Circuits' approaches. 
168. See supra notes 37-45, 112 and accompanying text. 
169. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
2075 (1989). 
170. This instruction is based on MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985). A portion 
of the wording is suggested in RICO Cases Committee, Criminal Justice Section of the 
American Bar Association, Jury Instructions for Civil and Criminal RICO Cases, 1987 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ostrich, or conscious avoidance, instruction is an important 
weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal. It allows for the conviction of a 
criminal who was clever enough to attempt to insulate himself or her­
self from liability by avoiding knowledge of certain acts or events. 
Nearly all of the federal courts of appeals allow the instruction in 
some contexts}'1 
The instruction presents special difficulties when used in a con­
spiracy case, however, especially when the defendant argues that he or 
she was not a member of the conspiracy. The Second Circuit does not 
allow the instruction in connection with proof of membership in a con­
. spiracy;172 the Seventh Circuit allows it freely.173 The Second Circuit 
approach is logically consistent. This approach is also in accord with 
the Model Penal Code, which is the source for the conscious avoid­
ance theory, and the instructions based upon that theory.174 More im­
portantly, the Second Circuit approach is in accord with the common 
law, from which federal conspiracy statutes are derived. On the other 
hand, it deprives the prosecutor of a valuable tool. The ostrich in­
struction is of some use even in cases where the defendant's member­
ship is at issue, because the defendant's deliberate ignorance, which is 
the equivalent of knowledge, makes it somewhat more likely that he or 
she was involved in the conspiracy and did intend to further its aims. 
In completely disallowing the instruction in these cases, the Second 
. Circuit perhaps goes too far. 
If a court gives the instruction in connection with a defense of 
nonmembership, that court should take additional precautions that 
the jury understands that it must also find that the defendant had the 
requisite intent to participate in the conspiracy. Perhaps the best ap­
proach here would be a standard, clarifying instruction which would 
focus on three issues: the role that knowledge and intent play in con­
spiracy, the need to find both knowledge and intent to further the con­
spiracy, . and the evidentiary value of deliberate ignorance in 
establishing that intent. With this set of instructions, the government 
could still make use of evidence that pointed to a defendant's deliber­
ate ignorance, and in tum, use that ignorance as evidence of the de­
fendant's actual participation in the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the 
171. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
172. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 (2d Cir. 1984). 
173. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 551. 
174. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text. 
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clarifying instruction would help ensure that the defendant would not 
be convicted without a finding of intent. 
Christine L. Chinni 
